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The Anglo-American law of obligations was profoundly reshaped in the two centuries after 
1800. In contrast to constitutional law, land law and even criminal law, whose substantive 
principles were laid out in general works such as Blackstone’s Commentaries, there was very 
little systematic thinking about the law of obligations, which tended to be discussed in terms 
of the remedies for enforcing them. Beginning in the later eighteenth century, however, and 
reaching its apogee a century later, jurists began to look for underlying principles which could 
explain the different aspects of the law of obligations, contract, tort and unjust enrichment. 
The theoretical turn which began in the earlier period continued into the twentieth century, 
though jurists’ confidence in their ability to uncover single comprehensive explanatory 
theories diminished. 
 
The transformation in thinking about the law of obligations was driven by contextual 
changes, both in society at large and in the legal domain. In an era of rapid economic growth, 
the volume of litigation which reached the superior courts at Westminster began to increase 
rapidly, after an eighteenth century slump. The nature of the litigation changed, as well as its 
volume. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw an expansion in the proportion 
of commercial cases which were litigated, with judges from Mansfield to Ellenborough 
playing key roles in shaping new rules of commercial law. The mid-century in turn saw an 
expansion in the number of cases involving consumers and share-purchasers. The courts also 
saw a rise in the number of cases arising from accidents in the public sphere, most notably on 
the roads, raising new questions of how to determine who should be liable for the resulting 
harm. Where, in the early modern era, the paradigm tort claim involved a party whose private 
space had been invaded by another, in the nineteenth century, attention was more often 
focused on harms caused by collisions in collective spaces.  These developments took place 
in the context of a relatively weak state, which preferred to leave it to the courts to resolve 
disputes between those whose interests clashed and to develop rules to co-ordinate their 
activities. In an era during which policymakers were heavily influenced by the theories of 
classical laissez-faire economists, governments were expected to remove barriers to the 
mechanistic operation of neutral economic laws, rather than to intervene with active social or 
economic policies. Private law could be seen as the neutral mechanism in which individual 
rational economic actors could co-ordinate their activity. Just as economists could seek for 
rational principles underlying the science of political economy, so jurists looked for rational 
principles underlying the science of law. 
 
By the start of the twentieth century, the political and ideological landscape had changed. The 
individualism which underlay the laissez-faire state was increasingly under attack, and the 
state began to intervene more to regulate matters which had hitherto been left to private law 
ordering. The state began to be much more interested in questions such as environmental 
protection, consumer protection and workmen’s compensation.  In England, the early 
twentieth century saw the birth of systems of social insurance which would culminate in 1948 
in the introduction of a ‘welfare state’. Welfarism and collectivism did not supplant private 
law, but it raised new questions about its role and function. The individualist models on 
which the later nineteenth century private law theories were based seemed much less apt for a 
society in which weak consumers were regarded as needing protection from corporate 
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vendors in ways commercial buyers did not, and in which most accidents were insured 
against. In these changing contexts, theorists began to rethink both the relationship between 
public law and private law remedies and also whether the individualistic theories 
underpinning nineteenth century conceptions of private law still held true. 
 
Nineteenth-century developments within the legal domain also generated new forms of 
theoretical thinking. Firstly, the mid-nineteenth century saw a series of procedural reforms 
which led jurists to think in new ways about substantive law. Led by David Dudley Field’s 
New York reform of civil procedure in 1848, half of American states had abolished the old 
forms of action by 1870. In England, a series of reforms between 1852 and 1875 had the same 
effect. Removing the framework provided by the technical forms through which lawyers had 
hitherto perceived the law forced them to look for other ways of organising the material. It 
was in these years, according to Frederick Pollock, that the ‘really scientific treatment of 
principles’ began.’1 Allied to this reform was the movement towards the fusion of courts of 
law and equity, again beginning in New York (in 1846) and ending in London with the 
Judicature Acts of 1873-5. It was not only the existence of a multiplicity of forms of action 
which fragmented the law of obligations. Owing to the different procedures used in law and 
equity, many cases involving contractual disputes or claims to reverse unjust enrichments had 
hitherto been brought in Chancery, and were treated by jurists simply as an aspect of equity 
jurisprudence. With the union of judicatures, jurists were able to seek general principles 
drawing both on legal and equitable doctrines. 
 
A second significant development within the legal domain was the renaissance of legal 
education both in England and America. English legal education had been in the doldrums 
since the later seventeenth century, but in the 1840s, reformers began to call for a more 
academic training for barristers. A modest series of reforms followed, with the Inns of Court 
setting appointing five readers in 1852, and introducing compulsory examinations in 1872. 
Efforts were also made at the ancient universities, particularly in the 1870s, to revive legal 
education. Oxford appointed a number of eminent jurists, including Frederick Pollock, W.R. 
Anson and A.V. Dicey, to its professoriate , and in 1885, the first English periodical devoted 
to law, Law Quarterly Review, was founded. The late nineteenth century saw a much more 
vigorous flourishing of the academic study of law in American universities, particularly after 
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s appointment as Dean of the law school at Harvard in 1870. 
Langdell assembled a formidable collection of scholars at Harvard, including Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, James Barr Ames, William Keener, Samuel Williston and John Wigmore. In the 
classroom and in print, these scholars set out to explore the principles of the common law, 
and show the innate rationality and logic of private law cases. 
 
While law faculties remained relatively weak in English universities, American legal 
education continued to thrive in the twentieth century. In a country in which common law 
rules were applied in a large number of different jurisdictions, academic lawyers were able to 
exert a stronger influence than was the case in the more centralised English judicature.  This 
was all the more so after the establishment in 1923 of the American Law Institute, which 
assumed the task of putting the complex and disordered common law applied across these 
                                                          
1  Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts: a treatise on the principles of obligation arising from 
civil wrongs in the common law (London, 1887), viii. 
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jurisdictions into a principled form. In the 1920s and 1930s, this body undertook a series of 
‘Restatements’ or core areas of private law, including Contract, Torts and Restitution, which 
were to prove highly influential. At the same time, the Langdellian ‘formalist’ model of legal 
scholarship - which saw law as an autonomous technical science, whose principles could be 
teased out by a process of induction from case law - came under attack, particularly from 
Realist scholars who were sceptical about the value of abstract doctrinal study, and who were 
much more interested in looking at the actual operation of law, and at the workings of law as 
a vehicle of policy. Under Realist influence, American legal scholarship became more 
focused on public law questions, and doctrinal private law scholarship fell into relative 
decline. By contrast, in England, where academic law began to flourish in the wake of 
university expansion in the 1960s, but where Realism was much less influential, private law 
scholarship began to thrive. 
 
Although theoretical perceptions of the law of obligations were revolutionised in the period 
under review, it would be a serious exaggeration to suggest that it was only in this era that 
scholars discovered the existence of distinct topics such as contract and tort. Lawyers had 
long been familiar with the distinction between contract and tort, for the rules of pleading 
forbade parties to join ‘contractual’ and ‘tortious’ forms of action.2 Nevertheless, the pace 
and timing of the theorisation of different parts of the law of obligations differed. Despite the 
existence of a variety of forms of action to remedy contractual breaches, English jurists 
already had an awareness of the conceptual unity of contract a century before the 
commencement of the period under review. By contrast, eighteenth century jurists did not see 
any conceptual unity in the law of torts: they rather saw that the common law provided a large 
variety of remedies for a disparate set of wrongs. As late as 1871, Holmes could say that tort 
was ‘not the proper subject for a law book’, since the harms rectified by the distinct actions of 
trespass, case and trover had little in common with each other.3 In this field, it took the 
abolition of the forms of action to spur thinkers to seek for underlying principles. It took 
longer still for unjust enrichment to be theorised; and indeed, many jurists continued to argue 
into the twentieth century that the division of contract and tort mapped the entirety of the law 
of obligations. It was only when jurists began to look across the borders of common law and 
equity that a new field began to be mapped out. If in each of these three areas, private law 
theorists searched for principles which would explain the nature and reach of the doctrine at 
issue, no jurist at the end of the twentieth century could plausibly claim that to have found the 
principle of his field. Instead, a multiplicity of theories in each area vied to explain areas of 




John Joseph Powell’s Essay upon the Law of Contracts and Agreements, published in 1790, 
is often taken to have been the first general treatise on its subject. For some scholars, it stands 
at the outset of an era in which the modern conception of contract was born, in which the 
freely negotiated executory contract replaced a notion that contractual obligations derived 
                                                          
2 See M Lobban, ‘Mapping the Common Law: Some Lessons from History’, (2014) New 
Zealand Law Review, 32-6. 
3 Book review, (1871) 5 American Law Review (1871) 340 at 341. 
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from the fairness of an (executed) exchange.4 Others locate it at the start of an era in which 
jurists began to rationalise contract law in terms of a will theory borrowed from continental 
civilian writers.5 In fact, neither the concept of the executory contract nor will theory were 
new to common lawyers. In his unpublished treatise on contract dating from the first decade 
of the eighteenth century, Jeffrey Gilbert had spoken of contractual obligations as deriving 
from the acts of the will of the parties entering into an agreement,6 while the author of the 
Treatise of Equity, published in 1737, also stressed that contracts required a ‘Union of Minds’ 
involving acts of deliberation.7 The fact that English law had a variety of forms of action to 
deal with contractual claims, and the fact that there were distinct rules pertaining to formal 
contract by deed, and informal or verbal contracts, did not mean that they could not perceive 
them as aspects of a larger whole. 
 
There were however very few systematic analyses of the law of contract before the end of the 
eighteenth century. Legal literature at the start of the century was still structured around 
different forms of action, such as The law of actions on the case for torts and wrongs (1720), 
or devoted to particular topics, such as Baron and Feme (1700). While there were no general 
works on contract law, there were treatises structured around the actions of covenant and debt 
sur obligation, both of which were used to recover on formal contracts.8 By contrast, there 
was no treatise devoted to the action of assumpsit,9 though this action (to recover on informal 
contracts) was much discussed in general abridgements. Formal contracts occupied much 
more scholarly attention than informal ones for a number of reasons. To begin with, such 
instruments were the vehicle for transactions involving land and family settlements, which 
were matters of prime concern to society where the main form of wealth was still in the land. 
Furthermore, since the middle ages, parties had also used penal bonds with conditional 
defeasance as a device to secure the performance of a much wider set of agreements. The 
sealed bond acknowledged a (penal) debt to the recipient, which would be voided by the 
performance of a condition stipulated in the agreement, but which would be due on failure to 
perform the condition. These contracts, which had been entered into with clear formalities, 
did not leave room for the court to discuss questions about when and how the contract had 
come into being. They did however offer plenty of opportunities for judges to discuss legal 
questions of interpretation and performance. This provided more material for textbook writers 
to discuss than did assumpsit, where it was largely a factual question for the jury as to 
whether the parties had made the agreement alleged. 
                                                          
4 Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977), 161. 
5 A W B Simpson, ‘Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law’, in Simpson, Legal 
Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law (1987), 178. 
6 See Jeffrey Gilbert on Property and Contract, ed. M Lobban (Selden Society vol. 134, 
2017), forthcoming. 
7 [H. Ballow] A Treatise of Equity (1737), 6. 
8 The Law of Obligations and Conditions (1693), The Law of Covenants (1711). 




By the early nineteenth century, however, the informal contract, enforced by the action of 
assumpsit, had become the paradigm contract for legal writers. While legal authors continued 
to produce works on the formal contracts, they were now only a niche in the market: the 
leading books, such as Samuel Comyn’s A Treatise of the Law Relative to Contracts and 
Agreements not under seal (1807) or Joseph Chitty’s A Practical Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts not under Seal (1826) were devoted to discussing the matter covered by assumpsit. 
The shift to the centrality of assumpsit may be explained in part by doctrinal developments in 
the courts leading to the decline of the use of penal bonds. The court of Chancery had long 
given relief against penalties on bonds, if it could see what sum was really due, or if the party 
could be adequately compensated in damages. In 1697 and 1705, statutes were passed to give 
the common law courts similar powers. This severely reduced the utility of the penal bond to 
coerce performance. Applying these statutes, common law judges began to articulate rules to 
distinguish between penal sums which could not be recovered and ‘liquidated damages’, 
which were enforceable contractual stipulations. Furthermore, by the end of the century, it 
was settled that these rules applied not only to contracts which were embodied in formal 
bonds, but also to informal contracts, and that juries in assumpsit cases were not free to 
ignore the ‘liquidated damages’ clauses agreed by the parties. In this way, rules developed for 
the relief of parties using one form of contract migrated into the other form, just at the time 
that these rules rendered penal bonds much less attractive to use. The second half of the 
century also saw judges seeking to diminish the discretion of juries in awarding damages 
more broadly in assumpsit by allowing motions for a new trial where damages had been 
excessive.10 
 
The late eighteenth century also saw an influx of new kinds of commercial litigation into the 
common law courts. In this context, judges who felt that  the ‘great object’ of mercantile law 
was ‘certainty’11 sought settle rules in numerous areas of commercial law, such as insurance 
and the sale of goods, thereby in effect reducing the scope of the jury to determine them as 
matters of fact. While numerous commercial cases were sued in actions of covenant - for 
many commercial instruments, such as charterparties, were formal instruments - many more 
cases came to court under the action of assumpsit.12 In such cases, the courts were not 
particularly interested in the form of action used, but in developing the underlying principles 
of law.  
 
In seeking to put the rules of English contract law into a rational framework, textbook writers 
were able to draw inspiration and ideas from Robert-Joseph Pothier’s Traité des Obligations, 
which was translated into English in 1806 by W D Evans.13 This work, which was based on a 
                                                          
10 See G T Washington, ‘Damages in Contract at Common Law’, (1931) 47 LQR 345 and 
(1932) 48 LQR 90. 
11 Milles v. Fletcher (1779) 1 Doug 231 at 232 (Lord Mansfield). 
12 Charterparties were formal contracts sued on in covenant. However, for leading cases on 
sale of goods or insurance sued in assumpsit, see e.g Parkinson v. Lee (1802) 2 East 314, 
Bilbie v. Lumley (1802) 2 East 469.  
13 W.D. Evans, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts, by M. Pothier (1806). 
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will theory of contract, not only discussed the nature of contracts and their formation, but 
examined vitiating factors, interpretation and damages. Pothier’s work has been credited with 
paving the way for a reception of civilian ideas into nineteenth century English contract law: 
once common lawyers began to think of contract in terms of the parties’ wills, it is argued, the 
way was opened for the articulation of new doctrines such as offer and acceptance, mistake 
and frustration, and the quantification of damages, which could borrow civilian rules. Some 
authors were clearly heavily influenced by Pothier’s exposition. One such was the Indian 
judge, Henry Colebrooke. His 1818 treatise, which began with the definition of contracts 
before turning to their validity, interpretation and effect and dissolution, drew relatively little 
on English case law, but referred extensively to both Pothier and other writers in the Roman 
law tradition, to give readers a comprehensive overview of the concept of contract.  
 
However, Pothier’s influence should not be exaggerated. Writers based in England, whose 
primary audience was one of practitioners, hardly needed his work to tell them that a contract 
was the product of an agreement by parties with contractual capacity.14 Nor had they much 
interest in exploring theoretical doctrines which had yet to come before the courts. These 
writers drew on Pothier only to the extent that he helped elucidate the concepts they were 
interested in. For instance, Comyn drew on Pothier’s rules for the interpretation of contracts, 
placing it at the outset of the second chapter of his second edition, on the construction of 
agreements. Chitty drew on Pothier’s contrast between pollicitations and contracts (as well as 
his discussion of contracts by correspondence in the Traité du contrat de vente) when 
discussing recent cases on the assent of the parties to the agreement.15 However, neither 
writer was interested in exploring other matters found in Pothier’s work, such as duress or 
mistake, for these were not questions which had as yet arisen in the case law of the courts 
with which they were dealing. Nor is it insignificant that these writers drew more on Pothier 
when revising their works for a second edition, than in their initial attempts. For the most 
part, these writers saw their task as one of digesting the recent case law on topics such as the 
sale of goods or damages. Authors such as these also elaborated doctrine on topics such as the 
performance obligations of contracting parties, whose original rules had derived from formal 
contracts, but which had now migrated to informal ones. 
 
It was this focus on the common law cases which accounts for the omission of detailed 
discussion of vitiating factors such as fraud or mistake, which were still largely the preserve 
of courts of equity. It was only when the common law courts began to be able to hear the 
evidence of parties and entertain equitable pleas that these doctrines found their way into the 
common law and into treatises. Thus the topic of mistake - a central concept in Pothier’s will 
theory - did not gain treatise treatment until S M Leake devoted a section to it in 1867, the 
same year in which it got its first judicial recognition, in Blackburn J’s articulation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Evans included a volume of notes comparing the English law. An earlier translation of 
Pothier’s treatise by F-X Martin appeared in North Carolina in 1802. 
14 See the English sources cited in Samuel Comyn A Treatise of the Law Relative to 
Contracts and Agreements not under seal (1807), 2-3. 
15 Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts not under Seal, 2nd ed (1834), 
8-12. 
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Roman law principle that ‘where the parties are not at one as to the subject of the contract 
there is no agreement.’16 Treatise writers, seeking a more principled elaboration of contract 
doctrine, were subsequently to play a large part in developing the law of contractual mistake, 
by reinterpreting older common law cases, and putting them into a theoretical framework 
borrowed from Pothier and F C von Savigny. The number of mistake cases which came to 
court was very small, and theoretically minded treatise writers who wished to present a 
coherent and complete vision of contract law, were able to give it a prominence in the texts 
which its position in the courts may not have merited.   
 
Academic lawyers in the second half of the century, such as Frederick Pollock, were much 
more explicit in identifying an underlying will theory than their early nineteenth century 
predecessors had been. However, it was evident that not all English doctrine fitted the model 
comfortably. The most problematic doctrine for will theory was the requirement that informal 
contracts carried consideration. Some eighteenth century judges and jurists had seen 
consideration as simply providing evidence of a necessary contractual will, suggesting that it 
was not an essential part of contract doctrine.17 However, this was hardly a position which 
could be taken by writers who made the informal contract the paradigm. The very same early 
nineteenth century writers who laid stress on the agreement of the parties also saw 
consideration as an essential component. Although this suggested that contracts had to 
involve some kind of exchange, jurists were quick to note that the law did not weigh its 
adequacy, since it would be unwise to interfere with the facility of contracting, and the free 
exercise of the judgment and will of the parties.’18 Still, there had to be some kind of bargain 
in the eye of the law, however unequal. Case law continued to generate multiple examples of 
what constituted consideration, though little attention was devoted to the theory underpinning 
it.  
 
By the mid-century, questions began to be raised whether seriously intended promises should 
be held binding notwithstanding the lack of consideration. Arguments were made that parties 
who had induced others to rely on their representations of their future intentions should be 
estopped from going back on them,19 and that parties who had promised to accept smaller 
sums in discharge of larger debts should be held to their promises, without any additional 
consideration being provided. In an era when courts were increasingly able to probe the 
parties’ actual intentions, and protect from fraud or undue influence, and when the technical 
requirement of consideration appeared to be commercially inconvenient, an opportunity was 
presented to reform the doctrine and align the common law with the demands of will theory. 
However, in Foakes v. Beer,20 the House of Lords declined to take this step, but rather upheld 
the centrality of consideration.  
                                                          
16 Kennedy v. Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1867) LR 2 QB 580 at 
587-8. 
17 See [Ballow], Equity (n 7 above) 37, Pillans v. Van Mierop (1765) 3 Burrow 1663 at 1665. 
18 Chitty, Contracts (1834) (n 15 above) 26. 
19 Such as that they would never enforce bonds given to them by the other party: Money v. 
Jorden (1852) 2 De G M & G 318, Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 HLC 185. 
20 Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605. 
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In fact, by the time Foakes v. Beer was decided, will theory had already begun to lose its 
attractions for those jurists who did not seek to import continental theories, but who wished to 
tease the principles of contract law out of English case law. It was C C Langdell at Harvard 
who led the way in seeking theoretical explanation for consideration. In his view, 
consideration was the promisor’s sole inducement to make the promise.21 This theoretical 
focus on the consideration requirement took jurists away from will theory towards a bargain 
theory, which stressed ‘the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, 
between consideration and promise.’22 At the same time that jurists theorised a component 
largely absent from will theory, so they began to draw attention to its weakness in explaining 
other aspects of the common law, such as the fact that in deciding whether contractual 
obligations existed, the common law considered not the subjective will of the parties, but 
their objective conduct. Langdell was blunt: ‘mental acts or acts of the will are not the 
materials out of which promises are made’.23 This led some jurists, including Pollock, to 
modify their theoretical views, and to begin to speak of contracts in terms of expectations 
generated by the promisor’s conduct on which the promisee could reasonably rely.24 Although 
scholars in England and America continued to debate the foundations of particular doctrines 
(including consideration), they retreated from the pursuit of a single master-theory, which 
could be the key to all of contract law.  
 
Consideration would remain a cornerstone of contract doctrine throughout the twentieth 
century, even though jurists struggled to find a theory which could explain it. Some, such as 
Anson, remained purists on the need for consideration. Others, such as Ames, interpreted the 
doctrine in a way broad enough to allow more or less any serious promise to be enforced.25 
Pollock’s view on this, as on so much else, was variable. Langdell’s work prompted him to 
insert a definition into the third edition of his textbook - of consideration as ‘the price for 
which the promise of the other is bought’26 - which hinted at the bargain theory, just as he 
was beginning to veer (under other influences) towards the reliance theory. Although 
struggling to find a theory which could adequately explain consideration, he defended the 
doctrine on practical grounds in the early twentieth century, before admitting a year before his 
death in 1937 that the doctrine could not be defended and should be consigned to history.27 
 
The bargain theory of contract which consideration embodied was qualified in the mid- 
                                                          
21 C C Langdell, A Summary of the Law of Contracts (1880) 71. 
22 O. W. Holmes, The Common Law (1880), 230. 
23 Langdell, Summary (n 21 above), 244. 
24 Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract at law and in equity, 3rd ed (1881), xx. 
25 J.B. Ames, ‘Two Theories of Consideration - II. Bilateral Contracts’ (1899) 13 Harvard 
Law Review 27. 
26 Pollock, Contract, 3rd ed (n 24 above) 179. 
27 Neil Duxbury, Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (2004), 204. 
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twentieth century by the emergence of a doctrine - promissory estoppel - which laid more 
stress on reasonable reliance. This doctrine found its way into the law largely thanks to the 
work of Samuel Williston, Reporter for the Restatement of Contracts. Though a doctrinal 
‘formalist’, Williston did not see the law as a closed logical system, but admitted that legal 
rules needed to conform to social needs. In his 1920 textbook, Williston identified several 
cases involving gratuitous promises in which the courts had ‘frankly admitted that estoppel 
and not consideration was the ground on which recovery was allowed’.28 He further suggested 
that it was arguable that ‘the fundamental basis’ of contractual obligations historically was 
rooted not in ‘the purchase of a promise for a price’ but in ‘justifiable reliance on a 
promise’.29 Although Williston hinted that reliance might take the place of consideration,30 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel which he drafted as section 90 of the Restatement was 
more cautious, leaving room on pragmatic grounds for a doctrine of consideration.31 The 
presumptive rule was that contracts should be bargains, made with consideration; but that rule 
could be dislodged where a person could have reasonably expected a promisee to act his 
promise, and where ‘injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise’. Although 
Williston’s own understanding of section 90 was not driven by a reliance theory (for he 
anticipated that expectation damages would be awarded for the breach of promise), later 
jurists, influenced by Lon Fuller and William Perdue’s famous critique,32 grounded the 
doctrine in a theory of reliance. This idea soon became mainstream in the academy, and was 
reflected in the revised version of section 90, drafted by Robert Braucher for the second 
Restatement of Contract.33
                                                          
28 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts, 4 vols. (1920), § 116 at 249. 
29 Williston, Contracts (n 28 above), § 139 at 307-8, 313. 
30 E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology’, (1987) 
Michigan Law Review (1987) 1406 at 1458-60. 
31 See Mark L Movsesian, ‘Rediscovering Williston’, (2005) 62 Washington and Lee Law 
Review, 207, 238. 
32 Lon Fuller and William Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (1936-7) 46 
Yale Law Journal 52, 373. 
33 See Edward Yorio and Steve Thel, ‘The Promissory Basis of Section 90’, (1991-2) 101 
Yale Law Journal, 111. 
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 Although different jurists and different jurisdictions have viewed the scope and basis of 
promissory estoppel in different ways,34 American courts accepted that it could be a cause of 
action to allow a claimant to recover.   
 
Promissory estoppel took longer to take root in England. In 1937, the Law Revision 
Committee reported that in many respects, the doctrine of consideration was a ‘mere 
technicality’ which was ‘irreconcilable either with business expediency or common sense’.35 
Although not calling for its abolition (given its embedded nature in English law), it 
recommended that all promises made in writing should be enforceable and that agreements to 
perform existing duties or to pay smaller sums for larger debts should not fail for want of 
consideration (which would override Foakes v. Beer). Although these recommendations were 
never implemented, promissory estoppel found its way into English law thanks to a number 
of judgments by Lord Denning.36 The English doctrine was more limited than the American, 
since it only provided a defence to a party who had relied on a promise by another not to 
enforce his rights against that party. However, in 1990, the Court of Appeal modified the 
doctrine of consideration, by recognising that the performance of an existing duty could 
constitute consideration in cases where it was of ‘practical benefit’ to the promisee.37 A 
bargain was complete if the subjective will of the promisee regarded it as beneficial. 
 
By the late twentieth century, no single theory could claim either to explain the underlying 
order in contract law or to give a complete account for why contracts were held to bind. 
Different scholars continued to defend theories based on the obligatory force of the parties’ 
wills or the defendant’s promise38 or theories which grounded the obligation in reliance.39 In 
addition to these theories of the ‘internal’ logic of the law, numerous scholars, particularly in 
North America, looked at contract law more instrumentally. Some applied economic analysis 
to contract law, exploring how contract rules promoted economic efficiency, while others 
looked empirically at the operation of contract law in various different kinds of markets. If 
theory flourished, it was often at a remove from doctrinal scholarship: the writers of late 
twentieth century textbooks, unlike their late nineteenth century predecessors, tended to 
plunge into doctrine without seeking overall theoretical explanations. At the same time, the 
rise of consumer protection legislation, designed to protect those of unequal bargaining power 
in the marketplace, and to regulate consumer contracts, made it evident that the unified ‘law 
of contract’, so striven for by the generation of Pollock and Langdell, had fragmented into 
increasingly bifurcated commercial and consumer rules. 
                                                          
34 See Eric Mills Holmes, Corbin on Contracts: Formation of Contracts, revised ed, (1996), 
vol 3, § 8.11. 
35 Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report: Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of 
Consideration PP 1936-7 [Cmd 5449] XIII.81, 17. 
36 Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House [1947] KB 130, Combe v. Combe 
[1951] 2 KB 215, D & C Builders v. Rees [1965] 3 All ER 837. 
37 Williams v. Roffey Bros and Nicholls (Contractors) [1991] 1 QB 1. 
38 See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligations (1981)  





If lawyers had long perceived contract law to have an underlying conceptual unity, nineteenth 
century tort law appeared much more fragmentary. It was, moreover, a system in flux, as 
modern economic developments accorded the concept of negligence a much more prominent 
role, when accidents resulting from reciprocally generated risks in the world began to replace 
the invasion of private spaces as the paradigm harm.40 It was consequently not until the 
1880s, after the forms of action had been abolished and law had been revived as a scholarly 
subject, that the first attempts were made to theorise torts. The pioneer was Oliver Wendell 
Holmes. His theory was not borrowed from continental models, but derived from an analysis 
of the development of English case law. Holmes put the notion of fault at the centre of his 
theory. As he saw it, a person should only be liable for the bad consequences of his acts if 
‘under the circumstances a prudent man would have foreseen the possibility of harm’.41 For 
Holmes, strict liability was not a principle rooted in the common law: where it existed, it was 
the result of a particular policy choice. In his view, parties should be liable in tort for all 
intentional acts which did harm, unless inflicted while exercising a privilege; and they should 
be liable for harms caused by their negligence. The standard of care required was an objective 
one, set by the community, rather than the subjective one of the actor. Other American jurists 
developed Holmes’s notion that fault lay at the heart of tort, seeing a trend in modern law 
away from strict liability and towards ethical standards.42 Some even argued that strict 
liability torts should be put into a different category altogether.43  
 
Holmes’s theory was taken up in England by Frederick Pollock. Seeking a principle to 
explain the developing law of negligence, he declared that ‘every one commits a wrong who 
harms another [...] by want of due care and caution in his acts or conduct.’44 If this seemed 
very open-ended, he envisaged controlling the scope of potential liability through rules 
relating to causation and damages, whereby a defendant would only be liable for the 
foreseeable consequences of his actions. Pollock also sought to articulate a general moral 
principle which could underpin all of tort law: ‘All members of a civilized commonwealth are 
under a general duty towards their neighbours to do them no hurt without lawful cause or 
                                                          
40 See Cornish et al, Oxford History, vol. 12, 903ff. 
41 Holmes, The Common Law (n 22 above), 96. 
42 See, eg, John H Wigmore, ‘Responsbility for Tortious Acts: its History’ (1894) 7 Harvard 
Law Review 315, 383, 441, James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, (1908) 22 Harvard Law 
Review 97 at 99. 
43 J Smith, ‘Tort and Absolute Liability - Suggested Changes in Classification,’ (1917) 30 
Harvard LR 241, 319, 409, N Isaacs, ‘Quasi-Delict in Anglo-American Law’ (1922) 31 Yale 
LJ 571. 
44 Draft Indian Tort Code, Clause 9 (Pollock, Torts, 13th ed (1929) 623-4). In his textbook on 
tort (1st ed (1887), 353), he stated a ‘general rule’ that ‘every one is bound to exercise due 
care towards his neighbours in his acts and conduct’. 
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excuse’.45 However, Pollock’s attempt to find general principles underlying tort law in 
general and negligence in particular did not gain universal assent. Taking a more traditional 
view, Sir John Salmond argued that the law of torts consisted of ‘a number of specific rules 
prohibiting certain kinds of harmful activity’ derived from the cases brought under the old 
forms of action.46 Salmond felt Pollock’s general principle was inconsistent with a number of 
recent high profile House of Lords cases.47 Nor was he convinced by Pollock’s theory of 
negligence: for Salmond, negligence was ‘carelessness in a matter in which carefulness is 
made obligatory by law’,48 where a particular duty was owed to the particular plaintiff.  
 
The debate over whether there were unifying principles underlying tort law continued to rage 
into the 1930s. Pollock’s quest was taken up by Percy Winfield, who reiterated the view that 
that all injuries done to another were torts, unless the law gave a justification.49 In Winfield’s 
view, the historical expansion of torts, through the action of the case, showed that there was 
no closed set of torts, as Salmond’s theory seemed to suggest. However, his argument was 
challenged by those (including a later editor of Pollock’s treatise)50 who reiterated Salmond’s 
point that the case law simply did not support the view that there was a general duty not to 
harm absent excuse. Instead, a range of established torts existed, which judges extended by 
analogy.51 In the second edition of his textbook, Winfield had to concede that English law 
recognised a definite number of torts outside of which liability did not exist, while still 
maintaining that the trend of the decisions was towards the unified principle he had 
identified.52 Furthermore, unlike Pollock (and even Salmond), Winfield did not consider fault 
to be an essential requirement of tort law: for such a definition could not account for strict 
liability torts.53  
Although the quest to find a single principle to explain tort law in toto appeared increasingly 
untenable, Pollock quest for a single principle to explain negligence fared better. In 1926, 
                                                          
45 Pollock, Law of Torts (n 1 above), 1.  
46 J Salmond, The Law of Torts, 2nd ed, (1910), 8-9. 
47 Bradford v. Pickles [1895] AC 587, Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 and Mogul 
Steam Ship v. McGregor [1892] AC 25. 
48 J Salmond, Torts 4th ed (1916),  21. 
49 Percy H Winfield, ‘The Foundation of Liability in Tort’ (1927) 27 Columbia Law Review 
1; A Text-Book of Torts (1937) p 15. 
50 In P A Landon’s view, tort law consisted of ‘a mere enumeration of actionable injuries’ and 
the tortious quality of an act could only be discerned ‘by reference to the experience of our 
forefathers’. Pollock, Torts 13th ed (1929) (n 44 above), 46. 
51 A L Goodhart, ‘The Foundation of Tortious Liability’ (1938) 2 MLR 1 at 10. 
52 P H Winfield, A Text-Book of Torts, 2nd ed (1943), 21. 
53 P H Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tort (1931) 216, 242-4. 
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Winfield traced the emergence over time of an independent tort of negligence,54 and six years 
later, in Donoghue v. Stevenson,55 Lord Atkin endorsed the ‘neighbour principle’ which 
underpinned it. Although Atkin spoke of a ‘duty of care’, Winfield argued that the concept of 
duty was redundant, the chief ingredient of the tort being the negligent conduct causing 
damage.56 In articulating this view, he was echoing Pollock. Although Pollock was careful to 
insist that absent a contract, there was no affirmative duty to prevent harm to others, he 
argued that once anyone embarked on any conduct ‘attended with risk’, they were bound to 
exercise care.  Pollock did, from his second edition, add that proof of ‘negligence in the air’ 
would not do, but this was only to illustrate the point that the negligence had to be connected 
to the injury57 - not (as Cardozo would later gloss it) that ‘negligence is not actionable unless 
it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest’.58 Nor did Winfield speak of the 
interests protected by law: in his view, in determining novel cases, judges had only to look to 
the guidance of Lord Atkin’s dictum in Donoghue v. Stevenson. For Winfield, the ‘control 
mechanisms’ in negligence were want of ‘sufficiency of evidence for the jury, contributory 
negligence, remoteness of damage, inevitable accident, volenti non fit injuria’.59 Like 
Pollock’s, Winfield’s formulation sought a principle which could be elaborated as a matter of 
doctrine. 
  
The concept of negligence as a distinct tort was also developed by numerous American jurists 
in the early twentieth century.60 Tort law books began to be dominated by negligence and the 
apparatus of concepts which served to limit its scope (such as causation or assumption of 
risk).61 However, American jurists soon began to focus more on external factors. To begin 
with, they explored how to put bounds on liability, given that almost anything might generate 
a foreseeable harm. In 1915, Henry T Terry argued that in determining what constituted 
negligent conduct, the utility of the defendant’s conduct both to himself and to society had to 
                                                          
54 Percy H Winfield, ‘The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts’, (1926) 42 LQR 184 at 
196. 
55 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580. 
56 Percy H Winfield, ‘Duty in Tortious Negligence’ (1934) 34 Columbia Law Review 41 at 
64. 
57 Pollock, Torts 4th ed (1895) 390, 405. 
58 Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co 248 N.Y. 339; 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
59 Winfield, ‘Duty in Tortious Negligence’ (n 56 above), 64. 
60 See eg Francis H Bohlen, ‘The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort’ in his 
Studies in the Law of Torts (1926) 33-155, at 61-3. Bohlen’s views were endorsed and 
applied in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co 217 NY 382, 111 
NE 1050 (NY 1916). 
61 See Francis H Bohlen, ‘Fifty Years of Torts’, (1937) 50 Harvard Law Review 1225 at 
1228. 
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be weighed against the magnitude of the risk to which it subjected others.62 This was to 
suggest that the law of negligence entailed a balancing interests rather than simply applying a 
moral principle. Moreover, by the 1920s, the formalist vision which had underpinned the late 
nineteenth-century quest for principle came under attack from Realist critics, who were 
sceptical about attempts to tease universal concepts out of reported case law. Rather than 
seeing law as an abstract moral science, they saw it as a tool of social engineering which 
reflected particular policy choices. Leon Green was particularly sceptical about the Holmesian 
idea that there was a single duty, holding that duties could only be owed to particular people 
in particular circumstances. In his view, the determination of whether a duty existed was a 
matter of policy, to be decided by judges who would consider which party was best placed to 
bear the risk of the activity, taking into account the broader needs of the community. The 
determination of whether a breach of that duty had caused harm to the plaintiff was a matter 
of fact for the jury, and did not depend on technical notions of the nature of causation.63 For 
the Realists, tort law was much more about compensation for accidental harms than about 
deterring faulty behaviour. 
 
Despite these attacks, a largely formalist vision was embodied in Restatement of Torts. Its 
reporter, Francis Bohlen, was not a Realist, and he devoted much attention to technical 
questions (such as causation) for which Green had little patience. Nonetheless, Bohlen also 
recognised the social anchoring of tort law. As he put it, it was inevitable that ‘changes in the 
relative importance attached by public opinion to the interests concerned, should have a 
controlling effect upon the judicial decisions which create the law of Torts’.64 He saw 
negligence law in terms of the interests it protected.65 Bohlen was not (like Pollock) devoted 
to searching for a single unitary theory for torts: indeed, he never wrote a torts treatise to 
match Williston on contract. He also played a leading role in drafting Pennsylvania’s 
Workmen’s Compensation legislation, and developed a theory to cover cases where those 
who created extra-hazardous risks could be held strictly liable.66 His Restatement 
consequently included a provision on ultrahazardous activity (§ 520) which had the potential 
to expand ‘strict liability on progressive enterprise liability principles’.67 
In the United States, the notion that tort law was about compensation rather than deterrence 
gained ascendancy in the mid-twentieth century. In 1959, Leon Green proclaimed that tort 
law was ‘public law in disguise’, pointing to the wider public interest in the outcome of any 
                                                          
62 Henry T Terry, ‘Negligence’, (1915) 29 Harvard Law Review 40. 
63 Leon Green, ‘The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases’ (1928) 28 Columbia Law Review 
1014 and (1929) 29 Columbia Law Review 255. 
64 Bohlen, ‘Fifty Years of Torts’ (n 61 above) 725-6. 
65 The idea that the law of negligence existed to remedy careless invasions of legally 
protected interests was clearly stated in the Restatement of Torts (§ 281). 
66 Francis H Bohlen, ‘The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher’ (1911) 59 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 298. 
67 Patrick J Kelley, ‘The First Restatement of Torts: Reform by Descriptive Theory’ (2007) 
32 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 93 at 119. 
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tort case.68 In this context, doctrinal scholars began to be sceptical about the centrality of fault 
and to expand doctrines which could protect consumers better. Whereas earlier jurists had 
sought to marginalise strict liabilities, later doctrinalists such as William Prosser argued that 
they could serve a useful policy function, such as shifting the burden of accidents caused by 
defective products onto producers who were best able to distribute the risk to the general 
public by means of prices and insurance’.69 In a number of influential articles in the 1960s, he 
argued for a recognition of strict liability to consumers for defective products,70 which began 
to be adopted in the case law.71 
 
In England, where university legal education remained weak, Realism failed to take root. 
Instead, debates remained solidly doctrinal. There was particular discussion about the scope 
of the tort of negligence after Donoghue v. Stevenson. Jurists in the mid-century accepted 
Lord MacMillan’s point that the ‘categories of negligence are never closed’,72 though they 
disagreed over whether the law should only be developed through analogies to previous 
categories or whether it could be expanded on the basis of Atkin’s broad principle. Although 
an increasing number of judges were ‘treating Lord Atkin’s “New Testament” doctrine as 
being of binding authority,’73 many jurists noted that the neighbour principle was not a 
‘general formula which will explain all conceivable cases of negligence’.74 It raised certain 
problems. Firstly, it begged the question of what constituted harms, or in other words which 
interests were protected by the law: for it was clear that some interests - such as purely 
economic ones - were not protected by the law of negligence. Secondly, where the interest 
was a protected one, a line had to be drawn between cases which were actionable and cases 
which were not. By treating this as essentially a question of whether the duty of care had been 
breached - and whether there was evidence to put to a jury - jurists like Winfield regarded it 
essentially as a factual question, of proximity or reasonable foreseeability. However, other 
jurists - and the courts themselves - preferred to see it as a question of law, with the judge 
deciding whether the relationship between claimant and defendant was one which generated a 
duty to take care.75 There had to be, in RWM Dias’s words, ‘recognised types of harm 
                                                          
68 Leon Green, ‘Tort Law Public Law in Disguise’ (1959) 38 Texas Law Review 1 at 2. 
69 William L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) s. 83 at 689. Prosser’s theory 
influenced Judge Roger Traynor’s approach in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. Of Fresno 
(1944) 150 P 2d 436. 
70 William L Prosser, ‘The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)’ 69 
Yale Law Journal (1960) 1099, and ‘The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer)’, 50 Minnesota Law Review 791 (1966). 
71 Eg Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc 377 P 2d 297 (1963). 
72 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 619. 
73 P A Landon, Pollock’s Law of Torts, 15th ed (1951), 329. 
74 R F V Heuston, ‘Donoghue v Stevenson in retrospect’, (1957) 20 MLR 1 at 23. 
75 See Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85 at 103 (per Lord Wright) and 
East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent [1941] AC 74 at 89 (per Lord Atkin). 
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[inflicted] in recognised ways on recognised categories of persons’.76 However, this meant 
that it could not be seen as a moral principle which could be straightforwardly applied to new 
cases. Rather, the law had to be developed by judges making choices as to which interests 
should be accorded legal protection.77 If courts continued to disguise policy choices by using 
the language of whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable, jurists recognised that in many 
cases ‘“duty of care” is a formula expressed in terms of results rather than reasons.’78 By the 
1960s and 70s, judges and jurists were more frank in expressing the policy foundations of the 
duty of care.79 
 
Even absent the intellectual challenge of Realism, a tort law based on ideas of individual 
moral fault looked increasingly out of kilter in a world of social and private insurance which 
spread the cost of harms more broadly losses. If the vision of tort of men like Holmes and 
Pollock had been that of a system designed to deter people from careless conduct, 
mid-twentieth century lawyers and litigants saw it more as a system to provide compensation 
for harms.80 English judges in the second half of the century became increasingly willing to 
extend the boundaries of negligence, making it available (for instance) in 1963 for economic 
losses caused by negligent misstatements.81 In 1970, Lord Reid held that negligence had 
come to be ‘regarded as depending on principle, so that, when a new point emerges, one 
should not ask whether it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles apply to 
it.’82 In 1978, the principle was reformulated by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London 
Borough Council  as involving as two stage test: first, the court had to look at whether the 
relationship of the parties was sufficiently proximate for a prima facie duty of care to arise; 
and secondly, if it did, the court should consider whether there were any considerations to 
should limit the scope of the duty or damages.83 
 
The expansion of negligence in England in the generation after the foundation of the welfare 
state was subsequently associated in the minds of some judges with an ‘assumption that 
anyone who suffers a loss is prima facie entitled to compensation from a person (preferably 
                                                          
76 R W M Dias, ‘The Duty Problem in Negligence, [1955] CLJ 198 at 204. 
77 G Williams, ‘The Foundation of Tortious Liability’ (1939) 7 Cambridge Law Journal 7 
(1939),111 at 114. Cf.  Warren A Seavey, ‘Chandler v. Crane, Christmas & Co: Negligent 
Misrepresentation by Accountants’ (1951) 67 LQR 466 at 469. 
78 Heuston, ‘Donoghue v Stevenson in retrospect,’ (n 74 above), 17. 
79 See Dorset Yacht Co v. Home Office [1969] 2 QB 412 at 426 (per Lord Denning); cf P S 
Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 2nd ed, (1975), 66. 
80 Thus, where insured drivers caused harm, their insurers were held liable regardless of the 
moral blameworthiness of the notional defendant: Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691. 
81 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
82 Dorset Yacht Co v. Home Office [1970] AC 1004 at 1026-7. 
83 Anns v. Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751.  
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insured or a public authority) whose act or omission can be said to have caused it.’84 In fact, 
courts allowing actions of negligence in the 1970s against governmental bodies were often 
more motivated by a desire to ensure those authorities did their jobs - in effect using private 
law for public law purposes.85 However, the potential ambit of negligence generated by the 
decision in Anns alarmed many and by the 1990s, the House of Lords was keen to reconsider 
the case. The decision was now characterised not as a statement of any established principle 
but ‘a remarkable example of judicial legislation’.86 Wilberforce’s two stage test was 
reformulated as a three stage test in deciding whether a duty of care exists, involving 
foreseeability of harm, proximity between the parties and it must be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ 
to impose a duty.87 Instead of seeking a general duty of care, courts turned once again to 
developing the law by analogy with existing duties, and considering the policy implications 
on other areas of law of extending duties of care. 
            
The 1960s and 1970s also saw a new flourishing of tort theory, particularly in North America.  
A number of theorists began to look at tort law through economic lenses.88 Instead of seeing 
tort law as a system of compensation, a number of theorists looked at how tort law could most 
efficiently prevent, or spread the costs, of accidents. Who was to pay for the social cost of 
accidents? Those who took an economic approach looked to place liability on the best cost 
avoider. Theorists such as Guido Calabresi argued that to promote the efficient allocation of 
resources, enterprises should be held liable for the true cost of producing their goods, which 
could be factored into their price. This suggested a theory of strict liability. By contrast, 
others, such as Richard Posner, argued that the negligence standard89 generated the most 
efficient rules of liability.90 According to his view, liability should be imposed on an 
enterprise if the benefit of accident avoidance exceeded the costs of prevention. Such a 
standard would induce parties to invest in accident prevention up to the point when it was 
cheaper to be sued. According to this view, which acknowledged the central role of insurance 
in modern economic life, tort liabilities had nothing to do with moral fault, but with 
promoting an economically efficient distribution of resources. Economic analyses were 
instrumentalist, seeing tort cases as presenting opportunities for judges to create incentives 
for economic agents to maximise their efficiency.  
                                                          
84 Stovin v. Wise [1996] AC 923, 949. 
85 See eg Lord Denning’s reasons in Dorset Yacht Co v. Home Office [1969] 2 QB 412 at 
456-7 and Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 at 
754. 
86 Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] AC 398 at 471. 
87 Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
88 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1, 
Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’ (1961) 70 Yale 
Law Journal 499. 
89 Notably as articulated in Learned Hand’s ‘formula’ in  United States v. Carroll Towing Co 
Inc 159 F 2d 169 at 173 (1947).  
90 Richard A Posner, ‘A Theory of Negligence’, (1972) 1 Journal of Legal Studies 29 at 33. 
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A rival theoretical approach developed in the 1970s which focused more on tort law as a 
vehicle of corrective justice. Corrective justice theorists were highly critical of the 
instrumentalism of the economic analysis, arguing that it failed to see that litigants in tort 
cases did not come to court to offer the judge a chance to create policy for the community, but 
to vindicate a particular right. Corrective justice theorists argued that what economic analysis 
saw as the function of tort law was in fact the function of legislation, which was much better 
placed to identify and regulate the best cost-avoider. For corrective justice theorists, many of 
whom drew on Aristotle’s concept, the key question was the how the court corrected the harm 
which had been done by one party to the other.  A number of theories were put forward. In 
1972, George Fletcher argued for a theory of liability for non-reciprocal risks: that every 
person has a right to security from risks beyond the general risks of background harms.91 In 
the following year, Richard Epstein put forward a theory of strict liability, based on the idea 
that person should prima facie be liable for all harms caused by his actions.92 In contrast to 
Fletcher’s theory of risk-generation (which also entailed the question whether the defendant’s 
action was reasonable), Epstein seemed to suggest that there existed a sphere of inviolable 
rights. Other corrective justice theories followed, notable Ernest Weinrib’s The Idea of 
Private Law (1995), which rejected all functionalist views of law which sought to understand 
it in terms of its political or social functions. Tort law, he argued, was neither about 
compensation nor deterrence: rather, it entailed restoring two free and independent parties 




The law of unjust enrichment was much slower to be theorised than the others.  Whereas the 
distinction between tort and contract was well rooted in English pleading rules from the early 
modern era, the categories set by the forms of action left little space for a distinct discussion 
of unjust enrichment, though it was clear to practitioners that both the common law and the 
Chancery offered remedies to reverse unjust enrichments. Litigants seeking to reverse unjust 
enrichments at common law could use either tortious or contractual forms of action: trover for 
property related claims, or an assumpsit for money had and received for money related 
claims. While English jurists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries referred to these 
claims as ‘quasi-contractual,’ Lord Mansfield’s classic statement of the ambit of the action 
for money had and received - that it was an ‘equitable action, to recover back money, which 
ought not in justice to be kept’93 - suggested that he did not perceive the obligation to derive 
from the contractual consent of the parties.  What made it quasi contractual was that the law 
implied a promise to repay the money which the defendant had no right to retain. 
 
In an era dominated by the forms of action and where law and equity were separated, jurists 
struggled to find a clear definition of the subject. Mansfield’s comment that it was an 
                                                          
91 George Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’, (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 
537. 
92 Richard Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’ (1973) 2 Journal of Legal Studies 151. 
93 Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005 at 1012. 
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equitable action - and the very title of the action of money had and received to ‘the plaintiff’s 
use’ - suggested that the courts might view the defendant as in some way a trustee of the 
plaintiff’s property. However, those who did attempt to define it often did so in a negative 
way - speaking of what it was not - rather than explaining what it was. For instance, Nathaniel 
Lindley said that ‘a quasi contract is an event giving rise to an obligation, and is characterized 
negatively, first by not possessing the essentials of a contract, and, second, by not being 
unpermitted, and so falling within the class of maleficia.’94 In an era where the rules of 
common law pleading distinguished sharply between contractual claims and tortious ones, 
and in which the Chancery remained a wholly distinct jurisdiction, it remained difficult to 
articulate principles in this area. 
          
The first scholars to think theoretically about unjust enrichment were James Barr Ames and 
William Keener. Discussing the history of assumpsits implied in law, Ames wrote that 
quasi-contracts were founded ‘upon the fundamental principle of justice that no one ought 
unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another’.95 This principle, he added, had 
established itself very gradually, growing initially from the action of account. Elsewhere, 
Ames spoke of the principle that ‘a court of equity will compel the surrender of an advantage 
by a defendant whenever [...] upon grounds of obvious justice, it is unconscientious for him 
to retain it at another’s expense’. This principle lay ‘at the foundation of constructive trusts 
and other equitable obligations created by operation of law (including implied or quasi 
contracts, which are really equitable liabilities, upon which the common law assumes to give 
a remedy)’.96 In the first treatise on the topic, Keener argued that the habitual classification of 
quasi-contracts as a kind of contract was both unscientific and ‘destructive of clear thinking’. 
In quasi-contract, he noted, the obligation did not derive in any sense from the wills of the 
parties, but from the law. Keener followed Ames in articulating the principle that no one 
should be allowed to enrich himself at another’s expense. It rested on ‘what in equity and 
good conscience the defendant ought to do’.97 Keener saw this principle as bringing together 
a range of cases, including money paid by mistake, waiver of tort and cases where parties 
were held to pay for benefits conferred where contracts had failed. Keener’s treatise - derived 
from his teaching at Harvard - was confined to unjust enrichment at common law and omitted 
the equitable topics. Nonetheless, in the early twentieth century, a number of other scholars 
began to speak of the constructive trust as ‘an equitable quasi-contract’,98 whose function was 
to respond to an unjust enrichment. 
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Early twentieth century American scholars thus began to see the similarity between 
constructive trusts and the common law ‘quasi-contractual’ remedies, and saw them as 
restitutionary vehicles based on a principle of reversing unjust enrichments.99 However, 
neither Ames nor Keener had given the topic systematic treatment. Its recognition as a 
distinct subject owed much to the 1937 Restatement of Restitution. The American Law 
Institute had initially proposed treating constructive trusts in the Restatement of Trusts, with a 
separate Restatement of Quasi-Contracts. However, by 1933, a decision was taken to convene 
a committee to restate the subjects of ‘restitution and unjust enrichment’, in which these two 
topics would be combined, with Warren A Seavey and Austin W Scott as Reporters. By 
bringing together these two topics into a single category, the Restatement was seen by many 
as laying the foundations of a new doctrine, which had been largely unrecognised hitherto. As 
the Reporters explained to English readers, the Restatement reflected a conviction that the 
topics covered were all subject to a unitary principle which had not hitherto been recognised,  
and in so doing recognised the ‘tripartite division of the law into contracts, torts and 
restitution’, each of which protected ‘one of three fundamental interests’.100 
 
English jurists were slower to embrace the notion theory sketched out by Ames and Keener; 
indeed in 1914 the House of Lords held that all claims for money had and received were 
personal contractual claims, which could only be brought where the parties had contractual 
capacity.101 Writers on contract, such as Pollock and Anson, saw that there was something 
distinct about quasi-contractual claims, but devoted very little attention to them. It was not 
until 1931 that Percy Winfield sought to sketch the contours of the common law aspects of 
the topic in a way which treated it as clearly distinct from contract, resting ‘on the ground of 
unjust benefit.’102  This view was rejected by Landon, who continued to insist that the 
liability had to be contractual, since there was no kind of obligation recognised in common 
law bar contract and tort.103 However, after the appearance of the Restatement, a number of 
English jurists and judges began to speak of a principle of unjust enrichment as underlying 
the case law,104 and in 1941 the House of Lords abandoned the fiction of the implied contract 
as underlying these claims.105 
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Ironically, the theory of unjust enrichment was to flourish more strongly in England than in 
the United States.106 As law schools became increasingly interested in instrumental, or 
policy-based analysis, an area of law which appeared grounded in a formalist methodology 
fell out of fashion. Equally, the fact that the Restatement still abounded with terminology 
derived from the old forms of action and division of law and equity made it seem increasingly 
unfamiliar to lawyers bred under a modern, simplified form of procedure.107 In 1987, Douglas 
Laycock reported that restitution was not systematically taught in law schools and was not 
litigated frequently enough to generate a fully developed body of precedent in each American 
jurisdiction.108 By then, after an abortive attempt to update the 1937 Restatement, there were 
even some doubts whether there was a coherent subject worth restating. The ALI’s initial 
response was to turn to include the matter pertaining to restitution in a restatement of 
remedies, but in 1995 the project of a new Restatement was revived with Andrew Kull as 
reporter.  
 
In the meantime, the subject had grown in England into the most vibrant area of private law 
scholarship. Two works proved to be particularly influential. The first was Goff and Jones’s 
The Law of Restitution (1966), which was the first English textbook to treat the subject as a 
distinct whole, in the manner of the Restatement. In 1985, Peter Birks published An 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution, which was the first English attempt to put the subject 
into a theoretical framework.  It was not long before the courts began to recognise unjust 
enrichment as a distinct source of obligations in English law.109 The category which had been 
given the name ‘restitution’ at the time of its first theoretical recognition was renamed ‘unjust 
enrichment’ by its leading proponents,110 to focus on the event giving rise to the obligation, 
rather than the law’s response to it.  
 
However, there has remained disagreement both as to the scope of the doctrine and the 
principles underlying it. A number of jurists have cast doubt on whether the cases collected in 
this category are properly explained as reversing unjust enrichments, or can be explained by 
more traditional doctrines. Some have indeed doubted whether there is a distinct category of 
obligations based on the principle of unjust enrichment. It has been argued that the cases are 
better explained as proprietary claims, in which the claimant’s property is returned to him, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
comments in Fibrosa Spolka Akcjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 
at 61.  
106 J. Langbein, ‘The Later History of Restitution’, in W.R. Cornish et al, Restitution: Past, 
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107 Andrew Kull, ‘Three Restatements of Restitution’, (2011) 68 Washington and Lee Law 
Review 867 at 371.   
108 Quoted in Kull, ‘Three Restatements’ (n 107 above) 877. 
109 Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v. Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548. 
110 See P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed (1985), C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson, 
Goff and Jones: the Law of Unjust Enrichment, 8th ed (2011). 
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as contractual ones, or as claims in tort.111 Despite these claims, however, unjust enrichment 
is now well-rooted in the case law, and continues to thrive as an area of academic debate. 
Nonetheless, its proponents are not united in their vision of the subject. According to its 
English proponents, led by Birks, the principle which is said to underlie the doctrine is that of 
reversing a defendant’s unjust enrichment at the claimant’s expense. When Birks articulated 
this principle, it was not set out as a normative one, but as a classification of what was done 
in particular cases in the common law. Nor was there any room for equity in his taxonomy.112 
While the enrichment had to be ‘unjust’, what counted as injustice was not seen by English 
unjust enrichment lawyers in moral terms. A transfer was unjust if the claimant had no 
intention to transfer the wealth (as where it was taken by the defendant without lawful 
authority, or was paid over by mistake, or by duress), or where a contract under which wealth 
had been transferred had totally failed. It might also be unjust in particular situations where 
policy dictated that it was so, without looking at the claimant’s intentions towards the 
defendant. However, some Australian jurists have seen unjust enrichment as embodying 
equitable ideas of unconscionability, derived from the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Chancery. Where for English lawyers like Birks, the concept of ‘unconscionability’ was a 
redundant - since it would always be unconscionable to retain an unjust enrichment - the 
Australian version invoked concepts of conscience to determine whether the enrichment was 
unjust in the first place.113 
          
 
By the end of the twentieth century, it was clear that the ‘formalist’ quest for comprehensive 
underlying principles which could explain the distinct nature of contract, tort and unjust 
enrichment had not generated theories which could gain universal assent. Legal scholars and 
judges have continued to seek the best explanations of developing doctrines in various areas 
of the law, in order to give the best coherence to the cases under review, but without 
necessarily seeking consistency or a rational order across the entire subject. In an era of 
increasing statutory intervention, and where the lines between public and private law have 
become more permeable, the vision of an autonomous private law which developed in the 
nineteenth century seems increasingly hard to maintain. Nonetheless, the distinct territories of 
contract, tort and unjust enrichment continued to be mapped out and debated, even as some 
critics argued that these categories can serve no more than a provisional, pedagogic function. 
Philosophically-minded jurists have continued to develop theories which can best explain the 
the nature and purpose of private law, just as economists and social theorists have continued 
to explore the operation and effect of law; though exactly how far the philosophical 
approaches and empirical approaches can exert an actual influence on the decisions of the 
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